In this paper we propose a modification of the Identity Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme (CPPA), which is based on Schnorr Signature Scheme (SS). The applicability and the security of the scheme is mainly considered in Intelligent Transportation Systems. We discuss scenarios with subliminal malicious setting of a ephemeral secret. We present a new, stronger security model for the scheme in which we allow the adversary to choose random values used during signing process. We define the SS to be secure if the advantage of the adversary in this model is negligible. Finally we prove the security of the modified Identity Based CPPA in our stronger model.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years Vehicular Sensor Networks (VSNs) have became an interest of a lot of researchers. They provide a lot of opportunities for modern transportation. Collecting information in real time can support traffic management and driving safety, especially in heavy traffic scenarios, road defects or bad weather conditions. There exist many propositions for cryptographic schemes applicable to VSNs (e.g. (Li et al., 2018) ). Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a subset of Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET), a network that is continuously self-configuring and does not have a fixed infrastructure. VANET supports communication between vehicles (V2V) and between vehicles and road side units (V2I). Two of the crucial features we require from such networks in the context of cryptography are security and privacy preserving of the identities of the participants. VANET is mainly used for providing safety related information and traffic conditions. Traffic management directly impacts driving comfort and safety. We can easily imagine scenarios in which maliciously altered traffic-related data causes dangerous circumstances on the road. Hence the legitimacy of the messages is one of our primary concerns.
Problem Statement and Motivation
It is very prevalent in cryptographic schemes to use ephemeral values, i.e. values drawn randomly from some sets and used in subsequent processing. We are mainly interested in scenarios in which an adversary (who we will call forger from this moment on) has the ability to learn how ephemeral secrets are produced or inject them by herself. In particular some implementations of the pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) can be prone to attacks (e.g. (Dorrendorf et al., 2007) ) or even deliberately constructed maliciously. It is also known that certification of hardware for cryptographic purposes can be a long and costly process, so many small producers choose cheap, but rather not trustworthy devices available on the market.
Many PRNGs are constructed in such a way that if the attacker learns the current state of the generator, then she can also predict its future outputs. A very basic example is Linear Congruential Generator (LCG). Breaking of this generator is often presented for students as an exercise.
Ephemeral leakage can often result in ability to forge signatures, impersonation or discovery of a secret key. This is why there is a lot of research on the security of PRNGs. However, we propose a different approach in which the security of the generator is not crucial anymore.
In the context of VSNs we are mainly concerned with situations where protocols are executed using untrustworthy devices, e.g. not certificated or maybe not updated by the manufacturer but claiming to meet the security standards.
In this paper we focus on the Identity Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme (He et al., 2015) in scenarios with the injecting/leaking of the ephemerals. We provide a new security model with ephemeral leakage, propose a modification of that scheme, and prove that it is a secure solution in our proposed model. We chose to research on this particular scheme because we noticed that improvement (in a sense of protection against ephemeral leakage) is possible and can be formally proved. We devote this paper entirely to this scheme because any modifications of secure schemes require a very careful analysis to ensure that current security features are not compromised.
Contribution
The contribution of the paper is the following:
• We propose a new security model for IdentityBased Conditional Privacy Preserving Authentication Schemes, stronger than the usual one. In this model the forger is able to choose and inject ephemerals in the signing process.
• We propose a modification of Identity-Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme from (He et al., 2015) , originally not secure in scenarios with ephemeral leakage/injection. We prove the security of the modification in the strong model.
Previous Work
In VANETs, privacy and message integrity is a widely researched concept. The legitimacy of the traffic related messages is crucial for safe traffic management. On the other hand, we require that a vehicle which sends traffic information cannot be tracked (privacy), except in the situations when it provides malicious information. Then some trusted third party should be able to discover the identity of such vehicle. That is the motivation for supporting conditional privacy and anonymous message authentication. Currently, there exist Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication schemes, e.g. ECPP , CPAS (Shim, 2012) , RAISE (Zhang et al., 2008) , PCPA (Ming and Shen, 2018) . Usually the security of ephemeral values or leakage consequences are not discussed by the authors. The discussion on the leakage of the ephemeral key and countermeasures have been shown for Schnorr Identification Scheme (Krzywiecki, 2016) and for Okamoto Identification Scheme (Krzywiecki and Kutylowski, 2017) . The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we recall Identity-Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme. In Section 3.3.2 we introduce our stronger security model which includes the ephemeral setting by the forger. In section 3 we propose the modified version of IdentityBased CPPA, and prove its security in our model.
IDENTITY-BASED
CONDITIONAL PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Preliminaries and Notation
Let G(1 λ ) be a (randomized) group generation algorithm that takes as an input 1 λ , and outputs a tuple
, where q is a prime number,
and G T is another group of prime order q. Let x be a private key of the system and X = g x be a public key. Let V denote the real identity of a vehicle. AID denotes an anonymous identity of a vehicle which consists of two ele-
represent four secure hash functions. We will use the following operations: ⊕ -XOR and "," -string concatenation inside a hash. Let m denote an element from the set of all possible messages M .
Bilinear Map: Let G 1 , G 2 , G T be groups of a prime order q. We defineê : G 1 × G 2 → G T as a bilinear pairing such that the following condition holds: 1) Bilinearity:
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption: For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A DL it holds that:
The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption: For any probabilistic polynomial time
The Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (CcDH) Assumption: (Saito and Uchiyama, 2004) For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A CcDH it holds that:
VANET Model
We model VANET using two layers:
• Upper Layer which consists of:
-third party Trusted Authority (TA) responsible for generating parameters and loading them to tamper-proof devices in vehicles and discovering the real identities of the vehicles if needed -Application Server supporting safety-related applications at the traffic management center. par ← ParGen(1 λ ): takes the security parameter λ as input, and outputs public parameters available to all users of the system (sk, pk) ← KeyGen: creates a pair of the public key and the secret key of the system and identities of the users. (t, sk t , TempAID) ← AIDGen(V, password, sk): verifies identity V with provided password and creates a timestamp t and associated with it secret key sk t based also on the secrey key of the system and anonymous identity TempAID.
σ ← AIDSign(t, sk t , TempAID, m): an algorithm creating a signature over the provided message using private temporary key and the identity. The signature plays roles both authenticating the message and identifying the signer. Verify(t, TempAID, pk, m, σ): an algorithm verifying if signature over given message is valid taking into account the public key, the timestamp and AID identity. The scheme is actually an extended identification scheme in which a prover together with identifying herself sends authenticated messages at the same time. The algorithms generating the key for the users are assumed to be secure and deployed in tamper-proof devices. In this particular case the security of the scheme depends solely on the security of the signature scheme, so unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme determines if the whole scheme is secure. Our exact modification is actually posing new security requirements for the signature scheme. Therefore in this paper we focus mostly on malicious ephemeral setting in the context of the signature scheme used in the main scheme.
MODIFIED IDENTITY-BASED
Our proposed modified Identity-Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme is depicted in Figure 1 alongside the regular scheme. Points with suffix "mod" come from modified version. The signing procedure requires one exponentiation and one call to hash function more. In the verification procedure one additional call to hash function and two executions of the bilinear pairing are required. In Theorem 3 we show that if an adversary attacking regular version of the scheme knows the ephemeral value from AIDSign, then she can easily compute the private key. Our solution is to mask this ephemeral value in such a way that knowledge of it does not allow to recover the secret key. We propose usage of a bilinear pairing.
Batch Verification
The original scheme supports also batch verification.
Here we omit discussion on this feature. Our modification is also scalable for verification of multiple messages at once. The full modification and the security proof is planned for future research. Key Generation:
2. Trusted Authority (TA) assigns a real identity V and a password for each vehicle and pre-loads {V, password, x} into its tamper-proof device. 3. The system parameters are sent to all RSUs and vehicles by the TA.
AID generation: (in a tamper-proof device) If V and password are equal to the stored ones then:
sends a tuple {AID, v,t} to the vehicle.
AID Signing: The vehicle generates:
. sends {m, AID,t, R, s} to the verifier 5modĝ = H 4 (R, h 3 ) 6mod S =ĝ s 7mod sends {m, AID,t, R, S} to the verifier Verification: The verifier checks:
Figure 1: Identity-Based Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme -Regular and Modified versions.
Correctness of the Proposed Scheme
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The Modified IdentityBased Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme, depicted in Figure 1 is correct, that is:
Proof. For properly generated keys the produced signature is always accepted by the verifier.
3.3 Security Analysis
New Stronger Security Model for Signatures
Definition 2 (Signature Scheme). Signature Scheme (SiS) is a system which consists of four algorithms (ParGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify):
par ← ParGen(1 λ ): takes the security parameter λ as input, and outputs public parameters available to all users of the system. (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(): outputs the secret key sk and corresponding public key pk. Sign(sk, m): an algorithm creating a signature over the provided message using private key. Verify(pk, m, σ): an algorithm to verify that signature over given message is valid.
We say that signature scheme is correct if for any pair (sk, pk):
To address the scenario with ephemeral leakage/injection we propose a new, stronger security model for SiS, based on models introduced in (Krzywiecki, 2016; Krzywiecki and Kutylowski, 2017) . In this particular model in the learning phase the malicious forger F has the ability to inject ephemeral secrets to the signing procedure.
Letr be a ephemeral secret chosen by F . Signing procedure executed by an honest signer with injected r will be denoted by Signr. The signer uses valuer as its random short term secret key. Let be the number of executions of Sign method (polynomial in λ).
Definition 3 (Chosen Ephemeral Forger -(CEF)).
Let SiS = (ParGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, ) be a signature scheme. We define security experiment Exp CEF,λ, SiS : Init : par ← ParGen(1 λ ), (sk, pk) ← KeyGen().
Sign Oracle : The sign oracle O¯r S accepts messages m i , ephemeralsr i and outputs corresponding positively verifiable signatures σ i generated with thē
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The oracle models the device in which the signatures are generated via the algorithm Sign, with injected ephemerals, controlled externally by the adversary: σ ← Signr(m).
Forger : Let the forger F Or S (pk, par), be the malicious algorithm initialized with the public key pk and parameters, having access to the signing oracle O¯r S . The forger F O S issuess a number of queries to O¯r S with the messages of its choice obtaining the corresponding signatures, wherer i , m i , σ i denote respectively: the ephemeral values, the message, and the signature in ith oracle query. Let R = {r 1 , . . . ,r } M = {m 1 , . . . , m }, and L = {σ 1 , . . . , σ } denote the set of the ephemerals, the set of the inputs, and corresponding outputs the oracle processes. Forgery : The forger generates a pair:
We define the advantage of F in the experiment Exp CEF,λ, SiS as probability of positive verification:
We say that the signature scheme is secure if
Theorem 2. The modified ModSchnorrSig Signature scheme, obtained by applying Fiat-Shamir transformation on Identification Scheme from (Krzywiecki, 2016) is secure in CEF model, assuming the CcDH hardness and programmable ROM.
Sketch. Essentially the same as the proof of the security of (Krzywiecki, 2016) scheme, utilizing the Forking Lemma (Pointcheval and Stern, 1996) . Omitted due to space constraints (to be included in the future research).
New Stronger Security Model for CPPA Scheme
Definition 4. Let CPPA = (ParGen, KeyGen, AIDGen, AIDSign, Verify) be a given scheme. We define security experiment Exp
AIDGen Oracle : The oracle O AIDGen accepts identifiers V and outputs AID, v,t. It models tamper resistant device with the secret key x, which produces secret key v for pseudonym AID. 
the set of pseudonyms with keys, the set of the ephemerals, the set of the inputs, and the corresponding outputs the oracles processes. Impersonation : The adversary generates a pair:
We define the advantage of A in the experiment
CPPA as probability of positive verification:
We say that the signature scheme is secure if with non-negligible probability without the appropriate secret key obtained from AIDGen procedure. We assume that the advantage of the adversary is nonnegligible. In the attack stage, by Forking Lemma, we get two tuples (m, AID,t, R, S 1 ), (m, AID,t, R, S 2 ). Subsequently those tuples can be used to obtainĝ v , also with non-negligible probability, for any valueĝ, provided to the A AIDSign adversary as the answer from programmable O H 4 oracle. Therefore the adversary can be used as a subprocedure by the efficient algorithm F ModSchnorrSig that forges the modified Schnorr signature scheme, obtained by Fiat-Schamirr transformation on (Krzywiecki, 2016) scheme.
Performance
Additional assessments of complexity were performed. They are not included in this paper due to the space constraint and the fact that they are not essential in the context of this paper, however they were acceptable in real-world applications.
CONCLUSION
We modified the Identity-Based CPPA from (He et al., 2015) to a version resistant to ephemeral key setting. This kind of setting can be used by the adversary in scenarios with possible leakage/injection of ephemeral values. In such scenarios a secret key masked by the ephemeral value is not secure even if it is stored in the secure memory module in the device. We proposed the stronger security model to cover that particular scenario and proved the security of the proposed scheme in our model.
